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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND RULE 301 AFTER St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993)
Tim D. Gray
I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs in disparate treatment employment discrimination suits1 are faced
with a formidable task. In order to prevail they must prove that the defendantemployer was motivated by a discriminatory intent. Most plaintiffs are not so
lucky as to have "smoking gun" evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent.

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2 the Supreme Court acknowledged this
problem and established a three-step evidentiary framework which allows a plaintiff to prevail in Title VII suits without any direct evidence of intent. In the first
step, the plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence. 3 If the plaintiff is successful, the fact-finder must presume
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee unless the employer can introduce evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment

1. This Note specifically addresses the implications of a Title VII disparate treatment case. The Supreme
Court has consistently distinguished between disparate treatment claims and disparate impact claims. See Hugh
Joseph Beard, Jr., Title VII andRule 301: An Analysis of the Watson and Antonio Decisions, 23 AKRON L. REv.
105 (1990). Disparate treatmentclaims focus directly on the employer's intent, whereas disparate impact claims
focus on the effects of an employment decision which, although facially neutral, has a different, and negative
impact on a specific group. Id. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (Title VII liability
incurred based solely on consequences of employment practice, regardless of whether intent was discriminatory). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 now provides for a separate presumption framework for disparate impact
claims. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (Supp. 1992). Thus, this Note does not address disparate impact claims.
However, the analysis in this Note is relevant to other employment discrimination claims that have adopted the
disparate treatment framework. The disparate treatment framework has been adapted to cases brought under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988); Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988); and the Civil Rights Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
See Patterson v. Mclean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-87 (1982) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); Dister v. Continental
Group, 859 E2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1988) (ERISA); Williams v. Edwards Apffells Coffee Co., 792 F.2d 1482,
1485 (9th Cir. 1986) (ADEA); see also Hamilton v. Svatik, 779 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1985) (once the plaintiff established a prima facie case of violation of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1982) and the Fair Housing Act (42
U.S.C. § 3604), the burden shifted to the defendant to rebut). Throughout this Note, where the term "employment discrimination" is used, the author is referring only to employment discrimination claims that utilize the
disparate treatment framework from the Title VII context.
2.411 U.S. 792 (1973).
3. Id. at 802. A prima facie case of race discrimination is established when a plaintiffproves by a preponderance of the evidence that (1)he was within the protected class; (2) he met applicable job qualifications; (3) despite these job qualifications, he suffered adverse employment action; and (4) after the adverse employment
action the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications from persons with similar
qualifications. Id.
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action taken against the plaintiff.4 In the final step, the plaintiff has an opportunity
to prove that the defendant-employer's reason for the employment action was not
the true reason for its actions.'
While the Court adopted this presumption framework more than twenty years
ago, until its recent decision in St. Mary's Honor Centerv. Hicks6 lower courts were
divided over whether a plaintiff who had disproved the defendant's asserted reason
for the employment action should automatically prevail on the issue of intentional
discrimination. 7 In St. Mary's, a five-to-four majority held that a finding of pretext
does not mandate a finding of discrimination.8
The St. Mary's Court provided little guidance to lower courts addressing summary judgment motions. Since the Court's opinion came down, lower courts have
disagreed as to what evidence a plaintiff must have in order to survive a defendant's summary judgment motion.' This Note shows that the Court adopted a standard which allows disparate treatment plaintiffs to reach the jury whenever they
have evidence that the defendant's reason is untrue, regardless of the absence of
other specific evidence of discrimination. Indeed, St. Mary's may be read as holding that a Title VII plaintiff who has established a prima facie case of discrimination may be able to defeat a defendant's summary judgment motion based solely on
his contention that he can discredit the defendant's explanation on crossexamination.
St. Mary's is also notable because of the Court's reliance on Federal Rule of
Evidence 301 as an independent basis for its holding."0 Rule 301 governs presumptions in civil actions. Basically, it states that presumptions may not have the
effect of shifting the burden of proof. 1 Rule 301 certainly is applicable to the

4 Id. The effect of the defendant's offer is commonly referred to as "rebutting the presumption." However, it
is important to note that the presumption still retains probative value even after the defendant has met its burden
of production. See FED. R. EvID. 301 advisory committee's note. Thus, the effect of the defendant's offer of a
nondiscriminatory reason is that the presumption is no longer mandatory. If the defendant were to fail to produce
any evidence at this point in the trial, the plaintiff would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748 n.3 (1993).
5. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
6. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
7. Compare Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990) (if the plaintiff convinces the factfinder that the defendant did not act for its proferred reason, judgment for the plaintiff is permitted, but not compelled) with Dea v. Look, 810 F.2d 12, 15 (lst Cir. 1987) (evidence that merely disproves the defendant's
proffered reason, without more, compels judgment for the defendant) and Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985) (if plaintiff convinces the trier of fact that the employer did not act
for its proffered reason, then judgment iscompelled for the plaintiff). See also infra notes 78-104 and accompanying text.
8. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
9. See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
10. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2747, 2749-51.
11. Rule 301 states:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a
presumption imposes on the party against whom it isdirected the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the
risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EviD. 30 1. For a cogent description of the difference between the burden of production and the burden of
proof, see infra note 189.
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presumption used in employment discrimination cases. However, an analysis of
the common law and legislative history of the Rule shows that it should not independently resolve the question presented in St. Mary's.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
In 1978, Melvin Hicks, an African-American, was hired as a correctional officer at St. Mary's Honor Center, a halfway house operated by the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources [hereinafter MDCHR]. 12 In 1980, he
was promoted to Shift Commander. Over the next four years, his supervisors consistently rated his performance as competent. 13 In January of 1984, Steve Long
became his new superintendent, and John Powell became Chief of Custody.14
Prior to their arrival, Hicks was never written up, suspended, or disciplined in any

way. 15
Within seven months after the arrival of Long and Powell, Hicks was written up
on three separate occasions for failing to adequately perform his duties.16 At the
request of Long and Powell, the Director of MDCHR suspended Hicks for five
days in March of 1984 for rules violations committed by his supervisees while
Hicks was the Shift Commander on duty. 7 No disciplinary action was taken
against the other St. Mary's employees involved in this incident.18 Later in March,
Powell formally disciplined Hicks for failing to investigate a fight between two inmates. 9 In another incident, the St. Mary's Disciplinary Board recommended that
Hicks be demoted for failing to enter the use of a St. Mary's vehicle into a log
book.2" Again, no disciplinary action was taken against the other St. Mary's employees involved.21 Hicks was subsequently demoted from Shift Commander to

Correction Officer

1.22

12. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.
1992), revd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
13. St. Mary's, 756 F Supp at 1246.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. The standard procedure for disciplining rules violators at St. Mary's was for a disciplinary review
board, which was composed of two whites, one of whom was John Powell, and two blacks, to make a recommendation to the superintendent, Steve Long. Id. at 1246-47 n.6. Long then made recommendations to the Director
of MDCHR, who made the final decision. I.
17. Id. at 1246-47. These violations included his supervisees being away from their posts, the absence of an
officer who was supposed to be at the front door, and the first floor lights being off. Id. at 1246.
18. Id. At trial, John Powell, Chief of Custody at St. Mary's, testified that it is his policy to discipline only the
Shift Commander for violations which occur during his shift. Id. at 1247.
19. Id. The district judge found that Hicks had initially been lied to about the fight, and when Hicks did find
out about it, he ordered a correction officer to submit a report. Id.
20. Id. Hicks allowed a St. Mary's employee to use an institutional vehicle to pick up another St. Mary's employee for work. Id. While the use of the vehicle was not a violation of St. Mary's rules, Hicks was disciplined for
failing to register the use of the vehicle in the proper log book. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. "John Powell, a member of the disciplinary board, voted to terminate [Hicks] for the infraction." Id. at
1247 n.7. Hicks was not informed of this decision until April 19. Id.
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John Powell informed Hicks of his demotion on April 19.23 Hicks was visibly
shaken and requested the rest of the day off.24 On his way out, however, Powell
followed him, and a heated discussion ensued in which Hicks informed Powell that
he was willing to "step outside." 2" Hicks left minutes later without further incident.2" Powell instituted disciplinary action against Hicks for the threats made during this confrontation.2 7 The Disciplinary Board, of which Powell was a member,
recommended that Hicks be suspended for three days. 28 Superintendent Long,
however, recommended termination.29 On June 7 the Director of MDCHR fired
Hicks. 3"
Hicks filed a three-count complaint against Steve Long and St. Mary's Honor
Center, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,31 42
U.S.C. § 198 1, and 42 U. S.C. § 1983, for demoting and terminating him because
of his race. 2 At trial the district court judge applied the three-step analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green for Title VII cases. 3" The judge found

23. Id. at 1247.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1248.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1245. Hicks' claim was specifically based on § 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section
703(a) reads:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or,
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
32. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F Supp. 1244, 1245 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F2d 487 (8th Cir.
1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993). The defendant's motion for summary judgment on the § 1981 claim was
granted prior to trial. St. Mary's, 756 F. Supp at 1245. Hicks did not include this judgment in his appeal to the
Eighth Circuit. St. Mary's, 970 F.2d at 488.
33. St. Mary's, 756 F Supp. at 1249. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court
set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging
discriminatory treatment. First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection." Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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that Hicks had successfully established a prima facie case of race discrimination.'
Consistent with McDonnell Douglas, the judge then stated that the effect of establishing this prima facie case was that it shifted to the defendants the burden of asserting "a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment
actions."" The judge then found that the defendants fulfilled this obligation with
their assertion that the employment actions were taken due to "the severity and accumulation of violations committed by [the] plaintiff."3"
Hicks introduced evidence on which the judge found that the reasons offered by
the defendants were pretextual. 7 The judge stated, however, that the plaintiff had
not "proven by direct evidence or inference that his unfair treatment was motivated
by his race."38 Thus, the court held that both defendants were entitled to judgment
in their favor, even though the court disbelieved their stated reasons for demoting
and firing Hicks.39
On appeal Hicks argued that "the district court erred in holding that plaintiff
failed to meet his burden of proving racial discrimination even though he had...
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendants' proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for demoting and terminating him were pretextual. " The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Hicks and reversed the district
court's judgment as to the Title VII and § 1983 claims.41 The court held that once

Marys, 756 F Supp. at 1249-50. The judge found that Hicks had successfully established a prima facie
34. St.
case of race discrimination by establishing that (1) as an African American, he was a member of a protected
class; (2) he met the applicable job qualifications of a Shift Commander; (3) he suffered adverse employment
action; and (4) after his demotion, the position "was presently filled by a white male." Id. at 1250. Actually, the
fact that the person chosen to fill plaintiffs position was a white male may not be relevant. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct.
at 2758 n. I (Souter, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court "has not directly addressed the question whether the
personal characteristics of someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff are material, and that issue is not before
us today." Id. (citing Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F2d 148, 154-55 (1 st Cir. 1990) (identity
of replacement is not relevant)).
35. St. Mary's, 756 F Supp. at 1250.
36. Id.
37. Id. From January 1984 to June 1984, Hicks brought no fewer than seven violations of institutional rules by
his co-workers to the attention of his superiors. Id. at 1248. In all but one of these incidents, no disciplinary
action was taken whatsoever. Id. In all but one of these incidents, the persons committing the violations were
curswhite. Id. In one of the incidents, Hicks recommended that one of his white subordinates be disciplined for
ing Hicks "with highly profane language." Id. John Powell, the supervisor who would later seek disciplinary
action against Hicks fur alleged threats on the day Hicks was demoted, "concluded that [the subordinate] was
merely venting justifiable frustration, and did not discipline [him] for the incident." Id.
38. Id. at 1252.
39. Id. at 1251. The district court judge never made a finding as to why Hicks was fired, but did imply that it
could have been for purely personal reasons. Id. at 1252. Judge Limbaugh stated: "It is clear that John Powell had
placed plaintiff on the express track to termination. It is also clear that Powell received the aid of. . . Steve Long
in this endeavor. The question remains, however, whether plaintiffs race played a role in their campaign." Id. at
1251. The district court also pointed to evidence tending to show that St. Mary's was not discriminating on the
basis of race. Id. For example, "[iun January, 1984 there were thirty blacks employed at St. Mary's. In December,
1984 there were twenty nine blacks employed at St. Mary's." Id. at 1252. The judge initially applied his findings
to the Title VII claim against St. Mary's. After finding that it was entitled to judgment in its favor, he stated that
Long was also entitled to ajudgment on Hicks' § 1983 claim because "[w]hen § 1983 is used as a parallel remedy
*with Title VII in a racial discrimination suit, the elements of the cause of action are the same under both statutes."
Id. at 1253 (citing Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984)).
40. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 488 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993).
41. St. Mary', 970 F.2d at 492-93. Hicks did not appeal the district court's decision as to his § 1981 claim. Id.
at 488.
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the district court judge found that Hicks had succeeded in showing that the reasons
offered by the defendants were pretextual, the judge was bound to enter judgment
in Hicks' favor.42 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was reversed, and
the case remanded for further findings on the remaining issues, including
damages.'
45
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and reversed the Eighth Circuit.
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reviewed the relevant trilogy of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green," Texas Departmentof Community Affairs v. Burdine,47 and
United States PostalService Boardof Governors v. Aikens,' and held that those cases
do not require a verdict for the plaintiff where the finder of fact simply finds that the
defendant's proferred reason for the employment action is false.' Rather, the factfinder must be independently convinced that race was the motivating factor. "
III.

HISTORY OF TITLE

VII

DISPARATE TREATMENT LAW

A. The McDonnell Douglas Frameworkfor Title VII
DisparateTreatment Cases
In McDonnellDouglas Corp. v. Green,"1 the Court set out the framework within
which Title VII cases should be decided.2 Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous
Court, set out a four-part test to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. A claimant may do so by showing
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for ajob
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. 3
The Court went on to explain that a plaintiff who shows a prima facie case establishes a rebuttable presumption that the defendant discriminated against the
plaintiff. ' The burden then shifts to the defendant to "articulate some legitimate,

42. Id. at 492-93.
43. Id. at 493.
44. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
45. Id.
46.411 U.S. 792 (1973).
47. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
48. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
49. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
50. Id. at 2756.
51. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas the Court held that the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's failure to determine that a reasonable cause existed to substantiate a Title VII claim did not bar a
later suit in federal court. Id. at 797. The Court also addressed "[t]he critical issue ...[of
the] order and allocation of proof in a private ... action challeging employment discrimination." Id. at 800.
52. Id. at 798-807.
53. Id. at 802. The Court noted that "[tihe facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and ... the prima
facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations."
Id. at 802 n. 13.
54. Id. at 802.
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nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."" By offering its reason
for the employment action, stated Justice Powell, the defendant rebuts the plaintiffs presumption of discrimination created by the prima facie case." The burden
is then on the plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent. 7
Unfortunately, the McDonnell Douglas opinion was ambiguous as to how a
plaintiff could prove discriminatory intent.5 8 First, the Court stated that judgment
for the plaintiff was required when the plaintiff had shown that "the [defendant's]
stated reasons for [the plaintiff s] rejection [were] in fact pretext." 9 This statement
implied that a Title VII plaintiff was entitled to judgment in his favor as soon as he
disproved the defendant's reason for the employment decision, regardless of
whether the fact-finder was convinced that the employer did in fact discriminate
against him. However, only a paragraph later the Court implied that the plaintiff
was not entitled to judgment simply by disproving the defendant's proffered reason
for the adverse employment action. The Court stated: "In short, on the retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent
evidence that the [defendant's proffered] reasons for his rejection were in fact a
cover up for a racially discriminatorydecision."6
The Court returned to the Title VII framework in Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine.61 In Burdine, the Court held that while the defendant does have the burden of producing a nondiscriminatory reason for firing the
plaintiff, the defendant does not have to persuade the finder of fact that the proffered reason was the true reason for her termination.62 The Court stated that the
burden on the defendant was only one of production." Thus, the defendant need
only "clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiffs rejection."64 The Court explained that after the defendant
offered evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason, the presumption created by the
prima facie case should "drop[ ] from the case." 65
The Court went on to describe the plaintiffs burden of proof after the presumption was rebutted.66 However, the opinion failed to resolve the ambiguity created
in McDonnell Douglas over whether a plaintiff had to prove that the defendant's
reason was simply pretextual, or whether the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant's reason was specifically a pretext for discrimination. The opinion stated both
(1) that a plaintiff need only prove that the defendant's explanation was

55. Id.
56. Id.at 803.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 804.
60. Id.at 805 (emphasis added).
61. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
62. Id.at253.
63. Id. at 255 n.8.
64. Id.at255.
65. Id.at 255 n. 10.
66. Id.at 256.
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"pretextual;"6 7 and (2) that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's proffered
explanation was a "pretext for discrimination."68
Thus, after Burdine, the question left open in McDonnell Douglas- whether the
plaintiff automatically prevailed by showing pretext only or whether he must
prove that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext for discriminationremained unanswered. The Court's opinion in United States Postal Service Board
of Governors v. Aikens69 showed that the Court was struggling with the question
and hinted at the direction the Court would eventually go.
In Aikens, the Court held that a plaintiff does not have to offer direct proof of
discrimination in order to prevail in a Title VII suit. 7 1 Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, pointed out that "[als in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his
case by direct or circumstantial evidence."71 Thus, the district court "should not
have required Aikens to submit direct evidence of discriminatory intent. 72 Justice
Rehnquist went on to state that when a defendant has produced evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, the presumption "drops from
the case. 73 Of course, Justice Rehnquist noted, the plaintiff should have an opportunity to show that the proffered reason was not the true reason but rather was
pretextual. 74 Justice Rehnquist then quoted Burdine, but added this caveat:
"The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion... [H]e may succeed in this either
directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence." In short, the districtcourt must decide which party'sexplanation it believes.75

The last sentence of this quote conflicted with the language from Burdine which
immediately preceded it. The Burdine quote stated that the plaintiff could prove
intentional discrimination simply by disproving the defendant's proffered reason.
The sentence with which Justice Rehnquist followed this quote implied that the
fact-finder must not only disbelieve the defendant's reason, but also must be independently convinced of the truth of the plaintiffs "story" of purposeful discrimination. Undoubtedly aware of this inconsistency, Justice Blackmun wrote a
concurring opinion which Justice White joined.7 6 The concurrence tried to establish that the former statement from Burdine was controlling:
While the Court is correct that the ultimate determination ... in discrimination
cases should be no different from that in other types of civil suits, the McDonnell
67. Id.
68. Id. at 253 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).
69. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
70. Id. at 713-14.
71.Id. at 714 n.3.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 714-15 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S 248, 255 n. 10 (1981)).
74. Id. at 716 n.5 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
75. Id. at 716 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 717 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail when at the third stage of a Title
VII trial he demonstrates that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason given by the
employer is in fact not the true reason for the employment decision.77

B. Lower Court Confusion: Whether a Finding
of PretextMandates a Finding of Discrimination
After Aikens, the lower courts split over whether a plaintiff who had already established a prima facie case could prevail simply by proving that the defendant's
proffered reasons were untrue. 78 Lower courts applied three different approaches. 7 Some courts held that once a plaintiff had proven that the defendant's
proffered reasons were untrue, then judgment was compelled for the plaintiff.8"
Other courts held that where a plaintiff could only prove the untruth of the defendant's explanation, without offering additional and more specific evidence of

77. Id. at 718 (citations omitted).
78. Compare Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990) (if the plaintiff convinces the factfinder that the defendant did not act for its proferred reason, judgment for the plaintiff is permitted, but not compelled) with Dea v. Look, 810 F.2d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 1987) (evidence that merely disproves the defendant's
proffered reason, without more, compels judgment for the defendant) and Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 647 (5th Cir. 1985) (if plaintiff convinces the trier of fact that the employer did not act
for its proffered reason, then judgment is compelled for the plaintiff). See generally Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies andthe PlaintiffLoses: The Fallacy ofthe "PretextPlus"Rule in Employment DiscriminationCases, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 59 (1991).
79. Some commentators have grouped the approaches into only two categories. See William L. Kandel, Age
Discrimination:Recent Decisions by Appellate Courts Under the Age Discriminationin Employment Act Through
Mid-1993 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-5163, 1993) (available on Westlaw);
Lanctot, supra note 78, at 71-100. Professor Lanctot described the division between the courts prior to St. Matry's
as being between "pretext-only" courts and "pretext-plus" courts. "Pretext-only" courts were those that held that a
plaintiff need only prove pretext in order to prevail in a Title VII disparate impact claim. Lanctot, supra note 78,
at 71. "Pretext-plus" courts were those that held not only that a plaintiff had to prove pretext, but also that the
plaintiff had to separately prove discriminatory motive as well. Lanctot, supra note 78, at 86-88. Similarly, Kandel also divided pre-St. Mary's courts into two groups, referring to "one step" courts (based on the fact that these
courts allowed plaintiffs to prove pretext and discriminatory motive in a single step) and "two step" courts (based
on their holding that a plaintiff had to prove pretext, and then further convince the fact-finder that the employer
was motivated by unlawful discriminatory considerations).
The result in St. Mary's is easier to understand, however, by creating a third category of cases-those cases
which held that a plaintiff could prevail based on a finding that the defendant's reason was untrue, but that judgment was not compelled by a finding of pretext. See, e.g., Shager, 913 F.2d at 401. Professor Lanctot characterizes these cases as "pretext-only" because the plaintiff can prevail by showing pretext. These cases would be
characterized by Kandel as "two step" cases because the plaintiff does not necessarily prove intentional discrimination by proving pretext. The reasoning of cases such as Shager was ultimately adopted by the Court in St.
Mary's. See infra text accompanying notes 162-66. Therefore, it is important to note that the reasoning of cases
such as Shager is analytically distinct from other "pretext-only" and "two step" cases.
80. See, e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carrier's, 830 F.2d 1554, 1564 (1 lth Cir. 1987) ("'[Tlhe McDonnell
DouglaslBurdineframework requires that the plaintiff prevail if the plaintiff demonstrates that the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer is not the true reason for the employment decision.'" (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)));
Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding that defendant's reason is untrue
negates the rebuttal effect of the defendant's proffered reason and leaves the plaintiffs prima facie case intact and
unrebutted); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633,647 (5th Cir. 1985) (if plaintiff convinces the trier of fact that the employer did not act for its proffered reason, then judgment is compelled for the
plaintiff); Harris v. Marsh, 679 F Supp 1204, 1285 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (plaintiff's presumption stands unrefuted
where the defendant's reason is found to be arbitrary), affd inpart and rev'd in part, Blue v. United States Dep't of
Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. deniedsub nom. Chambers v. United States Dep't of Army, 499 U.S.
959 (1991).
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discrimination, then judgment was compelled for the defendant. 8 Still others
adopted a third approach according to which a plaintiff who had shown the defendant's proffered reason to be untrue created a question of fact, thus precluding summary judgment for either side.82
1. Finding That Defendant's Reason Is Pretextual Mandates a Finding for the
Plaintiff
In Thornbroughv. Columbus & Greenville Railroad,8 3 the Fifth Circuit held that
once the plaintiff had proven that the defendant's proffered reason was pretextual,
judgment for the plaintiff was mandatory. 4 In so doing the court stated that by disproving the reasons offered by the employer to rebut the plaintiffs prima facie
case, the plaintiff effectively resurrected the presumption.8
In support of this resurrection theory, the court relied on Burdine for the proposition that" 'when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's action, it is more likely than not [that]
the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.' "88 So, the Thornbrough
Court added, "unlike Humpty Dumpty, the employee's prima facie case can be put
back together again, through proof that the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual."87

81. See, e.g., Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1990) (plaintiffs evidence that the employer's proffered reason is untrue is not enough to create a jury issue); Freeman v. Package
Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (1st Cir. 1988) (plaintiff cannot create a jury question merely by offering
evidence disputing the defendant's proffered reason); Dea v. Look, 810F.2d 12, 15 (lstCir. 1987) (evidence that
merely disproves the defendant's proffered reason, without more, compels judgment for the defendant); Gray v.
New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 255 (lst Cir. 1986) ("[Elvidence contesting the factual underpinnings of the reasons proffered by [the defendant] . . . without more [is] insufficient . . . to present a jury ques-

tion."); Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (evidence
contesting the defendant's asserted reason for discharge does not create a question of material fact), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 959 (1981).
82. See, e.g., Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401-02 (7th Cir. 1990) (once the defendant's reason is
shown to be untrue, judgment for the plaintiff is permitted, but not compelled); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of
Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff may, but does not automatically prevail where he has
proven that the defendant's proffered reasons are pretextual); see also Visser v. Packer Eng'g Assocs., 924 E2d
655, 657 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (falsity of defendant's reason permits, but does not compel finding for the
plaintiff) (dictum).
83. 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 640. Although Thornbroughwas an ADEA case, it nevertheless applied the McDonnell Douglaspresumption framework. Id. at 638-39 n.4. At the time Thornbrough was decided, most circuits were applying the
McDonnell Douglas framework in ADEA cases. Id. See Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d
1393, 1396 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1985); Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-32
(9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1004, 1014-16 (1st Cir. 1979); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591
F.2d 58, 60-61 (10th Cir. 1979). Butsee Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (refusing
to apply McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claim).
85. Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 640.
86. Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
87. Id.
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2. Finding of Pretext Alone Insufficient to Allow a Finding for the Plaintiff
In Dea v. Look,8" the First Circuit held that a finding of pretext alone was insufficient to permit a finding of discrimination. 89 In Dea, the plaintiff had successfully established a prima facie case of discrimination. 90 The defendant then
"articulated a plausible, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employment action and
filed a motion for summary judgment.91 The plaintiff pointed to evidence which
could show that the defendant's reason was pretextual. However, because the
plaintiff had no other specific evidence of discrimination, the district court
granted the defendant's summary judgment motion.92 The First Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the district judge's decision.93 The court stated that "evidence
contesting the factual underpinnings of the reason for the discharge proffered by
the employer is insufficient, without more, to present a jury question."94 The court
reasoned that allowing the plaintiff to create a genuine issue of material fact simply
by discrediting the defendant's proffered reason would "impose on the defendant
an almost impossible burden of proving [the] 'absence of discriminatory motive.' ,9

3. Finding of Pretext May Allow, But Does Not Require, a Finding for the
Plaintiff
In Shager v. Upjohn Co. , the Seventh Circuit held that a finding that the defendant's reason was pretextual created a question of fact which could either be
resolved for or against the plaintiff. 97 The district court in Shager granted the defendant's summary judgment motion based on the plaintiffs failure to offer evidence of discrimination beyond that which would show that the defendant's reason
was pretextual at trial." The Seventh Circuit reversed." The court acknowledged
that a finding of pretext did not automatically entitle the plaintiff to judgment.' 0
However, the court stated that as long as a rational fact-finder could infer that the
employer's reason was untrue, summary judgment was inappropriate, and the
plaintiff was entitled to proceed to trial."' The court reasoned that the fact-finder
could still infer, based on the plaintiffs prima facie case, as well as evidence

88. 810 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1987).
89. Id. at 16.
90. Id. at 14.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 14-16.
93. Id. at 16.
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id. (quoting White v. Vathally, 732 F.2d 1037, 1042 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 933 (1984)).
96. 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
97. Id. at 401-02.
98. Id. at 401.
99.Id. at 401-02.
100. Id. at 401.
101. Id.
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showing that the employer's asserted reason was pretextual, that the employer did
in fact possess a discriminatory intent. 0 2
Thus, under the rule adopted in Shager, a finding that the defendant's proffered
reason was pretextual would not mandate a finding for the plaintiff. 103 However,
create a genuine issue of a material fact, thus precluding sumsuch a finding would
10 4
mary judgment.
4. Differences Between the Three Approaches: Prelude to St. Mary's
These three approaches to summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas
framework produce very different results when applied to identical facts. For example, recall the facts of St. Mary's.1"' The plaintiff, Hicks, established a prima
facie case of employment discrimination based on his race. The defendant rebutted the presumption by offering a nondiscriminatory reason for firing the plaintiff-that the plaintiff was actually fired because of numerous violations of
work-place rules. The plaintiff then introduced evidence that proved that the defendant's proffered reason was pretextual, but did not offer additional evidence
that showed that it was specifically a pretext for discrimination. In courts applying
the rule applied in Thornbrough, the plaintiff would prevail on a summary judgment motion. In courts applying the rule applied in Dea, the defendant would prevail on a summary judgment motion. In courts applying the Shager rule, a
question of fact would exist which could not be resolved on a summary judgment
motion.
In order to resolve the divergent views among the lower courts, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks "to determine
whether, in a suit alleging ... intentional racial discrimination ...the trier of
fact's rejection of the employer's asserted reasons. . . mandates a finding for the
plaintiff."'0 6
IV.St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
The Court, in a five-to-four opinion, held that a finding that the employer's asserted reason for the employment action is untrue does not require a judgment for
the plaintiff.10 7 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that once the defendant introduced evidence of its reasons for the employment action, the presumption
was effectively rebutted and dropped from the case. 0 8 The Court explained that
the burden on a defendant is only one of production, not of proof.0 9 Thus, it held
that the defendant must only introduce evidence which, if taken as true, would
102. Id.
103. Id. at401-02.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 12-39 and accompanying text.
106. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746 (1993).
107. Id. at 2749. The Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the findings of the district judge
were "clearly erroneous" when considered in light of the St. Mary's opinion. Id. at 2756.
108. Id. at 2749 (citing Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)).
109. Id. at 2748-49.
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permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action. 1 Even if this reason later turns out to be "obviously contrived," 1" the presumption of discrimination is still rebutted, and the defendant would have still met
its burden." 2
The Court went on to acknowledge that the fact-finder's disbelief of the reason
put forward by the defendant may, along with the evidence establishing the prima
facie case, "permitthe trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination."113 Thus, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in holding that
"no additional proof of discrimination is required' in order for the fact-finder to
make a finding of discrimination. "' The Eighth Circuit, the Court stated, went too
far by holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reason compels judgment
for the plaintiff."5I The Court reasoned that compelling the fact-finder to find for
the plaintiff based solely on disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons effectively shifted the burden of persuasion onto the defendant." 6 This was improper,
the Court stated, because it disregarded both "the fundamental principle of Rule
301 that a presumption does not shift the burden" of persuasion, and the repeated
admonition of Title VII precedent that the plaintiff at all times bears the burden of
persuasion. "'
Justice Souter, joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens, issued a
sharp dissent.118 The dissent accused the majority of abandoning "two decades of
stable law" by ignoring language in both Burdine and McDonnell Douglas that required a judgment for the plaintiff when the defendant's proffered reasons were
shown to be pretextual. 1"'

The dissent relied heavily on the statement from

Burdine that once the defendant has rebutted the presumption of discrimination,
"the plaintiff can meet his burden of persuasion in either of two ways: 'either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is

110. Id. at 2748. Of course, if the defendant fails to meet this burden of production, and no reasonable minds
could differ as to the existence of the facts constituting a prima facie case, then the plaintiff is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Id. at 2748 n.3.
11.lId. at 2756.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2749.
114. Id. (citing St. Mary's, 970 F.2d at 493).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id. at 2756 (Souter, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2757.
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unworthy of credence.' "12 To the dissent, this statement clearly meant that a Title
VII plaintiff should prevail when he has proven that the defendant's proffered reasons are pretextual. 2 '
The dissent argued that the Court's holding was unfair to Title VII plaintiffs who
were not so lucky as to have direct evidence of discriminatory intent and was contrary to the reasons which originally compelled the Court to adopt the McDonnell
Douglas framework.122 By proving a prima facie case, the dissent explained, a
Title VII plaintiff has eliminated the most common reasons for demotion and firing, "that he was unqualified for the position or that the position was no longer
available." 23 Discrimination is therefore presumed, "because we presume [the
employer's] acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors."' 24 Requiring the defendant to come forward with nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions gives it the opportunity to set
the scope of the factual issues to be decided by the fact-fimder. ,2" When the defendant meets this burden of production, the trial should2 6be narrowed to a "new level of
specificity" -narrowed to the question of pretext.
The majority's holding was incorrect, argued the dissent, because it did not narrow the issues to be resolved at all. 127 Rather, it leaves employment discrimination
plaintiffs with the unfair burden of either having to produce direct evidence of discrimination or "eliminating the entire universe of possible nondiscriminatory reasons for a personnel decision.'128
Turning to the majority's assertion that limiting the scope of inquiry to whether
the defendant's proffered reasons were pretextual would place the burden of proof

120. Id. at 2760 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256(1981)). The dissent accused the majority's treatment of this passage from Burdine as amounting to a "rewriting" of it. Id. at 2760
n.7. The dissent stated that the majority discarded or ignored this as well as other language in Title VII precedent
because it was in dicta. Id. at 2765. Justice Souter stated that the type of evidentiary framework established in
McDonnell Douglas, and refined in Burdine, should not be casually abandoned merely because it is stated in
dicta, as lower courts and litigants rely on these statements in ordering their trials. Id. The dissent also attacked
the majority's reliance on Aikens. Id. Aikens repeated the language of Burdine that a plaintiff can prevail by proving that the defendant has lied. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U. S. 711, 716 (1983).
The Aikens Court then immediately stated that the district court must "decide which party's explanation of the
employer's motivation it believes." Id. (emphasis added). The dissent argued that this language barred the majority's conclusion that the fact-finder may disbelieve the defendant and still not find for the plaintiff. St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2765 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
121. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2758.
124. Id. (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
125. Id. at 2759.
126. Id. (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981)). The dissent
stated:
McDonnellDouglas makes it clear that if the plaintiff fails to show "pretext," the challenged employment
action "must stand." If, on the other hand, the plaintiff carries his burden of showing "pretext," the court
"must order a prompt and appropriate remedy" . . . .Burdine drives home the point that the case has
proceeded to "a new level of specificity" by explaining that the plaintiff can meet his burden of persuasion
by. .. "showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Id. at 2759-60 (citations and footnotes omitted).
127. Id. at 2759-61.
128. Id. at 2758.
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on the defendant, the dissent explained that the plaintiff would still have to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons were untrue.' 29 Thus, to the dissenters, once Hicks proved that St. Mary's reasons were
pretextual, Burdine required a judgment in favor of Hicks.13
The majority opinion responded to the dissent in detail, addressing the dissent's
accusation that the Court's opinion sets aside "settled precedent" and "decades of
stable law."13' Justice Scalia argued that the dissent's interpretation of precedent
was "utter[ly] implausib[lel," and "doesn't even pretend" to rely on the Court's
"prior holdings. 132
'
The Court's opinion then addressed what it described as the "dicta" upon which
the dissent relied. The majority sidestepped the most troublesome language from
Burdine, that a Title VII plaintiff could prevail indirectly by persuading the court
that the defendant's proffered reasons were untrue.133 Justice Scalia acknowledged
that the dissent's interpretation of this language was correct, stating that "[t]he
words bear no other meaning but that the falsity of the employer's explanation is
alone enough to compel judgment for the plaintiff."' 34 However, Justice Scalia continued, that passage must have been a mere inadvertence because: (1) the precedent from McDonnell Douglas that Justice Powell used to support the Burdine
passage did not support the proposition made in Burdine, but actually said just the
opposite; 3 ' (2) this passage contradicted other statements made in Burdine itself;' 36 and (3) giving this passage precedential effect would amount to shifting the
burden of proof onto the defendant- something Federal Evidence Rule 301 and
137
the "classic law of presumptions" expressly forbids.
Justice Scalia then turned to post-Burdine case law to lay the "problematic passage" from Burdine to rest.138 Justice Scalia pointed out that Aikens quoted the

129. Id. at 2759-60.
130. Id. at 2761. The dissent rejected the view that it is mandatory because the presumption was resurrected.
Id. at 2759 n.2. Justice Souter stated: "The question presented. . . is not whether the mandatory presumption is
resurrected (everyone agrees that it is not), but whether the factual enquiry is narrowed by the McDonnell
Douglas framework to the question of pretext." Id.
131. Id. at 2750 (Scalia, J.).
132. Id. at 2750-51. Justice Scalia stated that the dissenters were left with a position which "has no support in
the statute, no support in the reason of the matter, [and] no support in any holding of this Court." Id. at 2751.
133. Id. at 2752.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2753. Justice Scalia quoted the passage from McDonnell Douglas which stated that the respondent
"must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate. . . that whatever the statedreasonsfor his rejection, the
decision was in reality racially premised." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n. 18 (1973)).
136. Id. For example, at times the Court in Burdine stated that a plaintiff may prevail by showing that the defendant's proffered reasons were pretextual, and at others the Burdine opinion stated that the plaintiff must prove
that the proffered reasons were a "pretext for discrimination" as opposed to being merely pretextual. Id. (citing
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253-56 (1981)). See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
137. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753 (1993) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248 n.8 (citing
FED. R. EvID. 301; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.9, at 255 (2d ed. 1977) (presumptions
allocate burden of production only); 9 WIGMORE's EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1990))).
138. Id. at 2754.
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Burdine passage upon which the dissent relied, but then added: "In short, the dis' Justice Scalia
trict court must decide which party's explanation. . . it believes."139
interpreted Aikens to mean that in order for the plaintiff to prevail, the fact-finder
must actually believe the plaintiff's story, not simply disbelieve the defendant's.140
Finally, the majority rejected the dissent's argument that the majority opinion is
inconsistent with McDonnell Douglas' requirement that the defendant's offer
should move the inquiry to "a new level of specificity."141 The Court explained that
this "new level of specificity" only describes the change in the nature of the evidence before the fact-finder.142 By introducing evidence of a nondiscriminatory
purpose in making the employment decision, the Court explained, the defendant
moves the inquiry "from the few generalized factors that established a prima facie
case to the specific proofs and rebuttals . . . the parties have introduced [for the
employment action].""43
V.

EFFECT OF St.

Mary's ON EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION CASES

A. Scope of Fact-Finder'sInquiry
After the PresumptionHas Been Rebutted
The McDonnell Douglas framework allows the defendant to rebut the plaintiffs
presumption by offering a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action
taken. 1 " At the close of all evidence, the fact-finder often faces at least two competing explanations as to why the employment action was taken.14 However, after
St. Mary's it is clear that the fact-finder is not required to choose from either of
these two explanations in deciding whether to find for the plaintiff. In St. Mary's,
the Court stated that once the defendant successfully met its production burden of
articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, the
"McDonnell Douglas framework-with its presumptions and burdens-is no
longer relevant."14' This holding is consistent with the Court's admonition in
Aikens that "at the close of the evidence, the [d]istrict [c]ourt. . .should have proceeded to [the question of whether the defendant intentionally discriminated

139. Id. (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
140. Id. As evidence that his interpretation is correct, Justice Scalia pointed out that Justice Blackmun concurred in Aikens to state that a plaintiff need only prove pretext in order to prevail in a Title VII suit. Id. (citing
Aikens, 460 U.S. at 718 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). However, noted Justice Scalia, that concurrence was only
joined by one other Member of the Court. Id. See supra text accompanying note 76.
141. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2752, 2755.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2752.
144. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803 (1973). See also supra text accompanying notes
54-57.
145. For example, in St. Mary's the plaintiffs explanation was that he was fired because of race and the defendant's was that he was fired because of the accumulation and severity of rules violations. Hicks v. St. Mary's
Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E. D. Mo. 1991), rev'd, 970 F2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S.Ct.
2742 (1993). See also supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
146. St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.
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against the plaintiff] directly, just as district courts decide disputed questions of
fact in other civil litigation."147
St. Mary's does not limit the fact-finder to the question of whether the defendant's proffered reason is true, or even to whether the defendant's reason is more
likely than the plaintiffs reason. The sole issue is whether the evidence supports a
finding of discrimination. If the fact-finder is convinced that the employer was
more likely than not motivated by a discriminatory animus, then the plaintiff is
entitled to a judgment in his favor; if not, then the defendant must prevail, regardless of the veracity of its proffered reason.
This holding is a marked retreat from the Court's dicta in Burdine which stated
that "we presume [the employer's actions], if otherwise unexplained, are more
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors."'" After St.
Mary's, this is certainly not the case. Rather, if the employment decision is still
"unexplained" in the sense that the fact-finder is unable to divine why the employment action was taken, then the plaintiff has failed to meet his burden, and the defendant is entitled to a verdict in its favor.
For example, the district court in St. Mary's stated that Hicks' supervisors may
have been motivated more by personal animosity than by discriminatory intent in
firing Hicks, but never made a specific finding that animosity was the reason for
this firing.14 9 On appeal Hicks argued (1) that the judge was required by
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine to make a specific finding of why Hicks was
fired; and (2) that the district judge was precluded from choosing an explanation
that was never clearly offered by the defendant as a reason for the employment
action. 5 0 The Court replied to this argument by pointing out that the judge is not
required to settle on any specific reason for the employment decision anyway.1 5 '
Thus, after the presumption was rebutted, the factual inquiry was not limited to
the relative veracity of either party's explanation of the events at issue. 5 2
However, St. Mary's does not authorize the fact-finder to simply hypothesize
possible explanations for the employment action that do not have a basis in the record. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that Title VII cases will now be heard
by juries.'" St. Mary's sheds little light on the question of how judges ought to instruct juries in Title VII trials. " In cases similar to St. Mary's - where both sides
have offered explanations for the employment action in question and there are

147. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983) (footnote omitted).
148. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,254 (1981) (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v.
Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
149. St. Mary's, 756 F Supp. at 1251.
150. Respondent's Brief at 141-49, St. Mary's (No. 92-602).
151. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753-54 (1993).
152. Id.

153. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a-(c) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (providingjury trial right in
disparate treatment Title VII suits).
154. The Court mentioned the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 only briefly, stating: "Clarity regarding the
requisite elements of proof becomes all the more important when ajury must be instructed concerning them, and
when detailed factual findings by the trial court will not be available upon review." St. Mary , 113 S. Ct. at 2756.
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other possible nondiscriminatory reasons existent in the record-district court
judges will face the question of whether to limit the extent to which juries may
roam the record in their attempt to decide what actually motivated the employer.
The McDonnellDouglas framework contemplates a scheme whereby the plaintiff should have a "full and fair opportunity" to confront the other possible explanations for the employment action. 1"' Thus, juries deciding employment
discrimination cases should be instructed to focus specifically on the explanations
and those which the judge decides are adequately preoffered by the defendant
156
sented in the record.
Of course, the jury is not required to find any specific reason for the defendant's
actions. However, where the jury is unable to discern an explanation for the defendant's motivation, this lack of evidence explaining the employer's motivation
should provide an added inference that the defendant-employer was in fact motivated by a discriminatory animus. This inference is only natural because employers are certainly in a better position to bring the true, nondiscriminatory reason (if
there is one) for the employment action to the attention of the jury. 5 7 Of course, if
the jury specifically disbelieves the defendant's proffered reason for the employthey may infer the defendant's liament action, the jury should be instructed that
15 8
candor.
of
lack
defendant's
the
on
based
bility

155.Id. at 2747.
156. A possible test for whether an explanation suggested by the record should be considered by the jury is
whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding of that explanation if the jury were required
to do so. As the standard for sufficiency is whether a reasonable juror could find the existence of the fact based on
the evidence presented, this approach would only exclude consideration of evidence of explanations that were
ultimately irrelevant anyway. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
157. See Brief of the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and Others As Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent at 25, St. Mary's (No. 92-602) (citing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226
(1939) (failure of defendant to call witnesses under his control to contradict allegations of their unlawful conduct
-is itself persuasive that their testimony, if given, would have been unfavorable"); 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRI-

§ 291 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) ("The failure or refusal to produce a relevant document, or
the destruction of it, isevidence from which alone its contents may be inferred to be unfavorable to its possessor
ALS AT COMMON LAW

....");2 EDWARD J.DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 72.16 (3d

ed. 1977) ("Ifa party fails to call a person who possesses knowledge about the facts in issue, and who is reasonably available to him, and who is not equally available to the other party, then you may infer that the testimony of
that witness is unfavorable to the party who could have called him and did not.")).
158. See McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1985). The McQueeney Court stated:
It has always been understood. . . that a party'sfalsehood or otherfraud in the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence by bribery or spoliation, is receivable against
him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth and merit.
Id. at 921 (quoting 2 WIGMORE, supra note 157, § 278(2)). See also 3 EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 73.04 (4th ed. 1987) ("If a witness is shown knowingly to have testified falsely
concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust such witness's testimony in other particulars and you
may reject all the testimony of that witness or give it such credibility as you may think it deserves."); MCCoRMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 273 (2d ed. 1972) (wrongdoing by a party in connection with his
case also can be recognized as an admission of conduct).

19941

EMPLOYMENTDISCRIMINA TION

B. Employment DiscriminationPlaintiffs'Evidentiary
Burden in Meeting Defendants' Summary Judgment Motions
St. Mary's finally settles one question left open by McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine: whether judgment for the plaintiff is compelled when he has shown that
the defendant's proffered reason is false. The clear answer is no. Judgment is not
compelled simply because the plaintiff shows that the defendant's proffered
reasons for the employment action are untrue. The Court rejected Hicks' invitation to accept the Fifth Circuit's Thornbrough approach which compelled judgment for the plaintiff whenever he proved that the defendant's explanation was
untrue., 5 Still, employment discrimination plaintiffs can take consolation in the
fact that the Court rejected the invitation to accept the standard advanced by the
defendant, St. Mary's.160 If this rule had been adopted, plaintiffs would have had
much more difficulty getting past the summary judgment stage.161
The rule the Court did adopt resembles the approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in Shager.162 Under this approach, plaintiff-employees should be able to defeat
summary judgment motions rather easily. In St. Mary's, the Court explicitly stated
that the plaintiff could prevail without any additional evidence beyond that which
would call the truth of the defendant's proffered reason for the employment action
into doubt.163 Also, even after the presumption has been rebutted, the plaintiffs
prima facie case still retains probative value.164 The Court stated that the elements
constituting a prima facie case, together with the inference created by rejection of
the defendant's proffered reasons "permit the trier of fact to infer . . . intentional
'
discrimination. . . and no additional proof is required. 165
Thus, in order to with-

stand a defendant's summary judgment motion, an employment discrimination

159. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87.
160. See Brief of the National Association of Manufacturers As Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 4,
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (No. 92-602) (1993) ("[Wlhere an employment discrimination
plaintiff proves only that the employer's articulated reason is not the true reason for its action, judgment as a
matter of law should be properly directed for the defendant-employer. . ... "); Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chambers of Commerce of the U.S.A. in Support of Petitioners at 7, St. Mary's (No. 92-602) ("Plaintiffs cannot satisfy
their ultimate burden simply by offering indirect evidence that demonstrates that the employer's articulated reasons for the discharge are untrue.").
161. See, e.g., Dea v. Look, 810 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1987) (mere evidence showing untruth of defendant's proffered reason not enough to withstand defendant's summary judgment motion).
162. See Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that St. Marys apparently
adopted the Seventh Circuit's approach from Shager whereby a finding of pretext permits, but does not compel,
judgment for the plaintiff); see also supra text accompanying notes 96-104.
163. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting St. Mary's, 970 F.2d at 493).
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plaintiff need only show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the veracity of the defendant's proffered reason. "I
Since the Court announced its opinion in St. Mary's, courts have already begun
to disagree on what a plaintiff must show in order to create a fact issue on the issue
of pretext. 67
' Moisi v. College of the Sequoias Community College District'68 interpreted St. Mary's as allowing plaintiffs who have established a prima facie case to
reach the jury without offering any additional evidence that the defendant's reason
is pretextual, thus making it almost impossible for defendants to prevail on summary judgment motions. In Moisi, a California state court, interpreting a state
statute which applies the McDonnell Douglas framework, held that the defendant's
summary judgment motion must be denied even though the plaintiff did not have

166. Several post-St. Mary's decisions have borne this conclusion out. See Anderson v. Baxter HealthCare
Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (plaintiff need only offer
evidence discrediting the defendant's proferred reason in order to defeat a summary judgment motion) (citing Anderson); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1433 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[T]here will always be aquestion for the
fact[-]finder once a plaintiff estalishes aprimafaciecase and raises a genuine issue as to whether the employer's
explanation for its action is true."); Chu v. Samuel Geltman & Co., No. CIV.A.92-4480, 1993 WL 492747
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 1993) ("[Pllaintiff may defeat summary judgment by identifying evidence of record which
discredits the proffered reason or tends to show the ultimate fact of discrimination."); Flynn v. Goldman Sachs &
Co., No. 91 Civ. 0035 (KMW), 1993 WL 336957 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 1993) ("[I]n any case where the credibility
of conflicting witnesses must be assessed in deciding material issues of fact, the court should deny summary
judgment and let the trier of fact make that assessment.").
However, a few courts have stated that a mere question of fact sufficient to create ajury question on the issue of
pretext is not necessarily synonymous with a question of fact sufficient to create a jury question on the issue of
discrimination. See, e.g., EEOC v. MCI Int'l, 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1450-51 (D.N.J. 1993) (stating that evidence
proving pretext may still not be enough to avoid summary judgment); Wright v. Office of Mental Health, No. 92
Civ. 6547, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9275 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1993) (even if the plaintiff were to prove the defendant's reasons were pretextual, plaintiff could not prevail without additional evidence that the discharge was race
based).
The rationale of the courts requiring additional proof beyond that which would show pretext does not hold up
under either summary judgment or general Supreme Court employment discrimination precedent. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). Rule 56(c) states:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Id.
The party bearing the burden of proof at trial must "establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact" in
dispute in order to withstand a summary judgment motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475
U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). Clearly, in employment discrimination cases the question of whether the defendant's
reason is true is material. The St. Mary's Court stated as much, holding that "rejection of the defendant's proffered
reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer . . . intentional discrimination, and . . . '[n~o additional proof of
discrimination is required.' "St. Mary's, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes omitted).
Thus, in employment discrimination cases, a judge must always deny a defendant's summary judgment motion
when the plaintiff can show that there is a genuine fact question as to the credibility of the defendant's proffered
reason for the employment action.
167. Compare LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993) (interpreting St.
Mary's as requiring
plaintiffs to have additional evidence of discrimination in order to withstand defendant's summary judgment motions); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (interpreting St.
Mary's as requiring a plaintiff to show evidence of pretext before reaching trial); Griffiths v. CIGNA, No. CIV.A.91-2356, 1993 WL
452034 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1993) (interpreting St. Mary's as permitting a plaintiff who has established a prima
facie case to reach trial and attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact by cross-examining the defendant's
witnesses, but leaving the door open to a directed verdict for the defendant at the close of evidence); Moisi v.
College of the Sequoias Community College Dist., 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165 (Ct. App. 1993) (reported in 62
U.S.L.W. 2237) (interpreting St. Mary's as permitting plaintiffs who have established a prima facie case to reach
the jury regardless of whether they have additional evidence of discrimination or pretext).
168. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165 (Ct. App. 1993).
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evidence tending to disprove the defendant's proffered reason. The California
court stated that as a matter of law the veracity of the employer's reason for the
employment action was a question of fact which could only be resolved by the jury.
Thus, the plaintiff was able to defeat the defendant's summary judgment motion
even though he had no evidence that the defendant's proffered reason was un16 9
true.
At least one district court, in Griffiths v. CIGNA, has also suggested that
plaintiffs who have successfully established a prima facie case should not have
judgment entered against them on summary judgment motion because St. Mary's
requires that plaintiffs be afforded the opportunity to discredit the defendant
through cross-examination.1 71 The Griffiths Court, unlike the Moisi Court, did not
state that plaintiffs who had established a prima facie case are always entitled to
reach the jury. Rather, the court held that plaintiffs who have established a prima
facie case are entitled to reach trial and attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact by cross-examining the defendant's witnesses, thus leaving the door open
to a directed verdict for the defendant at the close of evidence.
Other courts have disagreed, requiring plaintiffs to offer evidence of pretext in
order to withstand summary judgment. 72 For example, in Bolton v. Scrivner,
Inc. ,73 a district court in Oklahoma specifically rejected the argument advanced
in Moisi. In Bolton, the court granted summary judgment to the defendant-

169. Id. The court stated:
Prior to. . . St. Mary's, several California appellate courts and numerous federal appellate circuits have
granted summary judgment in favor of an employer who came forward with nondiscriminatory reasons
for the challenged conduct which were not then rebutted by specific evidence offered by the plaintiff attacking the reasons given as pretextual. In other words, when faced with a motion for summary judgment, the court [below] refused to allow the plaintiff to rest on an assertion that the nondiscriminatory
reasons given were untrue or pretextual without evidence placing the reasons given at issue. However,
our reading of. . .St. Mary's compels us to conclude these earlier decisions are no longer valid.
[St. Mary's] states clearly that the truth or falsity of the employer's proffered reasons for the challenged
action is for the trier of fact and that mere disbelief of the reasons offered together with the elements of the
prima facie case and any inferences which might be drawn by the trier of fact is enough to prove intentional discrimination.
Id. at 171-72 (citations omitted).
170. No. CIV.A.91-2356, 1993 WL 452034 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 1993).
171. See id. In Griffiths, the district court stated:
[St. Mary's] compels the conclusion that defendants' production of unrebutted evidence of a lawful nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiffs dismissal at the summary judgment stage does not by itself resolve
the question of credibility, which is reserved for the trier of fact. Under [St. Mary's], plaintiff is entitled to
a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate, through presentation of his own case and cross-examination of
defendants' witnesses, that the reasons proffered are not the true reasons for plaintiffs dismissal, but that
an unlawfully discriminatory reason was the sole cause of his dismissal. . . .There is "no rule of law that
the testimony of a discrimination plaintiff, standing alone, can never make out a case of discrimination
that could withstand a summary judgment motion."
Id. (quoting Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 896 F.2d 793,797 (3d Cir. 1990)). The Griffiths Court concluded: "Undoubtedly, the holding in [St. Mary's] will preclude summary judgment in most employment discrimination cases, at
least in those cases where as here the employee can establish a prima facie case." Id. at n.2, n.3.
172. See,e.g., Chu v. Samuel Geltman & Co., No. CIV.A.92-4480, 1993 WL 492747, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
17, 1993) (plaintiff, in order to survive summary judgment motion, must show some evidence to cast doubt upon
the proferred reason); Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 783, 791 (W.D. Okla. 1993) (requiring plaintiff to
produce evidence of pretext).
173. 836 F. Supp. 783 (W.D. Okla. 1993).
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employer based on the plaintiffs inability to offer specific evidence that the defendant's reason was untrue.174 The court rejected the Moisi standard because it
would allow plaintiffs to avoid summary judgment without any evidence of pretext. 175 The court stated that after a defendant has offered its nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment action, the plaintiff then has the burden of producing
additional evidence of pretext. The Bolton Court stated that the Moisi standard
gives employment discrimination plaintiffs a lower burden than plaintiffs have in
other civil trials because the plaintiff could "ignore this burden of production and
proceed to trial when he has offered no evidence that could possibly controvert the
defendant's justification."1 76 Thus, the court concluded that absent specific evidence of pretext an employment discrimination plaintiff cannot survive a summary judgment motion, and so held that the plaintiff could not proceed to trial.177
Burdine supports the approach taken by the Moisi and Griffiths Courts. Burdine
clearly states that a plaintiff may prove pretext solely through cross-examination of
the defendant's witnesses. In Burdine, Justice Powell stated that "there may be
some cases where the plaintiffs initial evidence [of his prima facie case], combined with effective cross-examination . . . will suffice to discredit the defendant's explanation. "178 St. Mary's clearly states that a finding of pretext, when
combined with the already-established prima facie case, will permit a judgment
for the plaintiff. Thus, the argument goes, as cross-examination may be sufficient
to prove pretext, and pretext may be sufficient to prove discrimination, a plaintiff
should be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the defendant's witnesses before the judge should consider a defendant's summary judgment motion.
General principles of summary judgment also support the argument that plaintiffs who have established a prima facie case should be allowed to cross-examine
the defendant's witnesses before summary judgment is appropriate. Summary
judgment is only appropriate where there is "no genuine issue as to any material
fact. ' 179 In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Court noted that a material issue of fact
is one which would affect the outcome of the litigation.' 80 The credibility of the
defendant's proferred reason is clearly material in employment discrimination
cases because St. Mary's holds that as a matter of law rejection of the employer's

174. Id. at 785.
175. Id. at 790-91.
176. Id. (citation omitted).
177. Id. at 792. The Bolton Court did not state that a plaintiff should never be able to avoid summary judgment
based on his inability to bring forth additional evidence of pretext. The Bolton Court opined that
in a case where the subjective evaluation of a supervisor provides the basis for the defendant's defense,
credibility might be relevant to the evaluation of pretext. However, even in such a circumstance, it would
still be incumbent upon the plaintiff to provide the court with at least some basis, some rationale why it
should allow this excursion into the witnesses' (and, ultimately, the defendant's) credibility.
Id.
178. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10 (1981).
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
180. 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). See also Jansonious, The Role of SummaryJudgment in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 4 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 747 (1988) (available on Westlaw).
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proferred reason is sufficient evidence for a finding of intentional discrimination.1 81
However, it is doubtful whether the St. Mary's Court intended to fashion a rule
whereby plaintiffs who had made out a prima facie case would inevitably reach the
jury. In fact, there is no need to rule, as a matter of law, that the evidence establishing the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination, without any additional
evidence of pretext will always, or will never allow a plaintiff to reach the jury.
Rather, courts should recognize that in some cases the evidence establishing the
prima facie case will be sufficient to create a question of fact as to whether the defendant's reason is pretextual. In others, the evidence establishing the prima facie
case may not be sufficent to cast doubt on the employer's proferred reason without
some additional evidence of pretext.
In determining whether such a question of fact exists, courts should keep in
mind that evaluating the credibility of witnesses is a role traditionally reserved for
the fact-finder.182 Moreover, plaintiffs using the McDonnell Douglas framework
have already produced sufficient evidence to meet their initial production burden
by establishing their initial prima facie case of discrimination.1 83 Thus, summary
judgment will, in many cases, be inappropriate until the plaintiff has had an
opportunity to cross-examine the defendant's witnesses, and where this cross-

181. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
182. See Hardin v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., No. 78-3679 (W.D. Ky. 1978), aftd, 636 F.2d 1217 (6th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated:
[lIt is inappropriate to resolve issues ofcredibility, motive, and intent on motions for summary judgment.
It is equally clear that where such issues are presented, the submission of affidavits or depositions is insufficient to support a motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment simply may not be granted when such matters as the defendant's motive and intent
are questioned.
Hardin, 451 U.S. at 1008-10 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). But see Jansonious, supra note 180 (asserting that the
effect of the Court's holding in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986), is that summary judgment may
be granted to employment discrimination defendants).
183. Of course, the general rule is that where all the non-moving party can point to is his claim that he will
discredit the movant on cross-examination at trial, summary judgment is appropriate. See JACK H. FRiEDENTHAL
ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.3 (1985). Also, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Court held that summary judgment may be granted even where the defendants' intent is a key element of the plaintiffs claim. Anderson, 477
U.S. at 246. However, disparate treatment plaintiffs should be able to defeat defendants' summary judgment motions because they have already met their initial production burden by establishing a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the plaintiff is not relying solely on his contention that he can discredit the
defendant on cross-examination, but is also relying on the inferential value of his already established prima facie
case to cast doubt on the defendant-employer's asserted reason for the employment action.
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examination raises any doubt as to the defendant's credibility, the case should be
submitted to the jury."
VI. St. Mary's As

A PRESUMPTIONS CASE: RULE

301

St. Mary's is also notable because of the majority's reliance on Federal Evidence
Rule 301 and the "classic law of presumptions" as an independent reason of why
the holding of this case was correct.18 The Court reasoned that compelling judgment for the plaintiff upon a finding that the defendant's reason was untrue
amounted to shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant. Rule 301 specifically
prohibits presumptions from shifting the burden of proof onto a defendant.186 The
Court's reliance on Rule 301 is confusing because neither the text nor the history
of Rule 301 would seem to prevent the Court from placing the burden on the plaintiff to disprove the truthfulness of the defendant's explanation in disparate treatment cases.
A. Common Law History of Presumptions
Presumptions are "device[s] that require[] the trier [of fact] to draw a particular
conclusion when the basic facts are established, in the absence of evidence tending
to disprove the fact presumed." ' 87 Historically, the two primary views of how
rebuttable presumptions ought to operate are those of Professor Thayer and
Professor Morgan.188

184. Some courts may find it useful to allow the plaintiff to cross-examine the defendant's primary witness at
the summary judgment motion hearing. Rule 43(e) specifically places such use of oral testimony at summary
judgment hearings within the discretion of the trial judge.
The Court may have to revisit the McDonnell Douglasframework yet again to answer the question of whether a
prima facie case entitles the plaintiff to an opportunity to cross-examine the defendant's witnesses at trial. See,
e.g., Fisher v. Rutgers State Univ., 62 U.S.L.W. 3383 (3d Cir. May 27, 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3451
(U.S. Jan. 1, 1994). In Fisher, the Third Circuit affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment to a defendant on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to present evidence that the defendant's reason for firing her
was untrue. Fisher, 62 U.S.L.W. 3383 (3d Cir. May 27, 1993). A petition for a Writ of Certiorari was filed. Id.
The first question presented was whether there is a "need to clarify standards for summary judgment in 'pretext'
employment discrimination cases in light of St. Mary's v. Hicks." Id. The Court denied review. Fisher, 62
U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Jan. 1, 1994).
185. St. Mary's, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. For a pre-St. Mary's analysis of how Rule 301 should bear on Title VII
claims, see Beard, supra note I (discussing why Rule 301 requires uniform treatment between disparate impact
and disparate treatment claims). But see supra note I (Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to produce a
separate presumption framework for disparate impact claims).
186. Rule 301 states:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the
risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.
FED. R. EviD. 301.
187. CHRISTOPHER B. MuELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 754 (2d ed. 1983).

188. This Note does not address so called "irrebuttable presumptions," as they are more akin to substantive
rules of law and are not covered by Evidence Rule 301.10 JAMEs W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE

§ 301.03 (1994).
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Thayer presumptions only shift the burden of production, not the burden of
persuasion. 189 Once the defendant against whom the presumption was in effect has
offered evidence that would support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact, the presumption is rebutted and supposedly vanishes. Because the
presumption is rebutted upon presentation of evidence of the fact's non-existence,
regardless of whether or not the evidence is later discredited, this theory has been
dubbed the "bursting bubble theory."1 90
The more expansive view of presumptions is that of Professor Morgan.191 In
Morgan's view, a presumption is created against a litigant for the same reasons that
a plaintiff is saddled with the burden of persuasion.192 Thus, the Morgan presumption shifts not only the burden of production, but also shifts the burden of persuasion, or proof, as well. 193 Most scholarly commentary prior to the adoption of Rule
301 focused on the Thayer-Morgan debate.' 94
B. FederalRule of Evidence 301
The Advisory Committee appointed by Chief Justice Warren to formulate the
Rules of Evidence for the federal courts recommended that the Federal Rules of
Evidence adopt Morgan's view. 9 ' The Court did so and submitted it to Congress. 96 The House substantially revised the Court's rule.' 97 The House version

189. J.B. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 336 (1898) (reprinted by Augustus M. Kelley, 1969). One commentator has described the difference between the burdens of production and persuasion in this way:
"Burden" has two meanings in the law of evidence. One burden is that of producing evidence of a particular fact, sometimes called the burden of going forward with the evidence. If the party who has the
burden of production fails to present evidence that would permit a finding on that factual issue, the party
with that burden will lose. The burden of production is met, not by convincing the fact finder of the truth
of the fact, but by satisfying the court that such a finding could be made. The second. . . [meaning of
burden] is the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the alleged fact is true. This burden is called the
burden of persuasion or the risk of nonpersuasion.
Mack A. Player, The EvidentiaryNature ofDefendant's Burden in Title VII DisparateImpact Cases, 49 Mo. L.
REv. 17, 23-24 (1984) (citations and quotations omitted).
190. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.0113].
191. See Morgan, Instructing the Jury on Presumptionsand Burdens of Proof,47 HARV. L. REv. 59 (1933).
192. Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forwardat Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REv. 909, 913 (1937).
193. Id. In addressing the Thayer presumption, Morgan states: "If a policy is strong enough to call a presumption into existence, it is hard to imagine it is so weak as to be satisfied by the bare recital of words on the witness
stand or the reception into evidence of a writing." Morgan, supra note 191, at 82:
194. See MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.04[2].
195. MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01[3].
196. MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01[5]. The proposed rule stated:
Rule 301 Presumptions in General
In all cases not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules a presumption imposes on the
party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the non-existence of the presumed fact is
more probable than its existence.
MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01 [5]. The Court rejected the Thayer approach because it gave presumptions too
"slight and evanescent an effect." MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01[3] (quoting Morgan & Maquire, supra note
192, at 913).
197. MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01[6].
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adopted a compromise position between the approaches of Morgan and Thayer.198
The House version adopted Thayer's view that a presumption should only shift the
burden of production, not of persuasion, to the party against whom the presumption was directed. However, the House tried to give a presumption more effect
than the usual Thayer presumption by stating that after the presumption was rebutted, it should still serve as evidence of the formerly presumed fact.
The Senate rejected this version on the grounds that using the rebutted presumption as evidence of the fact was "not intellectually workable." '99 The Senate
version discarded the portion of the House version which provided for the presumption to be treated as evidence. However, it retained the portion which
adopted Thayer's approach- that the presumption only shifted the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion. The Senate version read:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress
or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the
burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does
not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion,
which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast.2"'
This version was adopted as Federal Rule of Evidence 301.
The report accompanying this version pointed out that its effect was clearly to
shift to the party against whom it is directed a burden of coming forward to rebut
the presumption, not to shift the burden of proof onto that party. 21 The Senate
Report also pointed out that even after a presumption is rebutted, the court may
instruct the jury that "they may infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof

198. The House version read:
(Matter in Court's rule stricken out by the House is in brackets, new matter in italics)
Rule 301 Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and Proceedings
In all civil [cases] actions andproceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules
a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of [proving that the non existence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence] goingforward with the evidence, and even
though met with contradictingevidence, a presumption is sufficient proof of thefactpresumed to be considered by the trieroffacts.
MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01[5].
199. MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01 [ 1]. Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court addressed the impracticability of treating a presumption as evidence in this way: "It is impossible to weigh a rule of law on the one
hand against physical objects and personal observations on the other to determine which would more probably
establish the existence or non-existence of a fact." Speck v. Sarver, 128 P.2d 16, 21 (Cal. 1942). At the time
Speck was decided, California common law required that a rebutted presumption be treated as evidence. Id. California's experience with this rule was so unsuccessful that the current California Evidence Code states that "a
presumption is not evidence." CAL. EVID. CODE § 600 (West 1993).
200. FED. R. EvID. 301. See also MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01[7].
201. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,7055-56.
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of the basic facts giving rise to the presumption."" 2 Thus, while the presumption
itself is not evidence, the facts which established the presumption may, on their
own, naturally provide an inference of the existence of the presumed fact.20 '
C. Majority's Reliance on Rule 301
Rule 301 is basically a default rule in that it only covers presumptions which are
judicially created and which do not fall under the purview of another rule.20 4 Rule
301 applied to the presumption in St. Mary's because there is nothing in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 that specifically provides for it.2"' While Rule 301 does apply
to the presumption in this case, the Court's holding was not compelled by it.
The majority opinion in St. Mary's relied on Rule 301 as an independent basis
for its conclusion that a finding of pretext does not mandate a finding for the plaintiff.20 6 The majority was correct in stating that the presumption was rebutted by
the defendant's production of a nondiscriminatory reason, regardless of whether it
is later found to be untrue.27 This finding is entirely consistent with Thayer's view

202. Id. The Senate Report read, in part:
This rule governs presumptions in civil cases generally. Rule 302 provides for presumptions in cases
controlled by State law.
As submitted by the Supreme Court, presumptions governed by this rule were given the effect of placing upon the opposing party the burden of establishing the nonexistence of the presumed fact, once the
party invoking the presumption established the basic facts giving rise to it.
Instead of imposing a burden of persuasion on the party against whom the presumption is directed, the
House adopted a provision which shifted the burden of going forward with the evidence ....
. .The
T effect of the rule as adopted by the committee is to make clear that while evidence of facts
giving rise to a presumption shifts the burden of coming forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, it does not shift the burden of persuasion on the existence of the presumed facts. The burden of
persuasion remains on the party to whom it is allocated under the rules governing the allocation in the
first instance.
The court may instruct the jury that they may infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the
basic facts giving rise to the presumption. However, it would be inappropriate under this rule to instruct
the jury that the inference they are to draw is conclusive.
MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.0118] (quoting S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7055-56).
203. For example, the Court in Burdine stated:
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that the trier of fact no longer may
consider evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. . . .[T]his evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of
whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n. 10 (1981).
204. Rule 301 works in conjunction with Rule 302, which requires that "[iun civil actions and proceedings, the
effect of a presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies
the rule of decision is determined in accordance with State law." FED. R. EvlD. 302.
A federal court, in deciding a state law claim, should look to what effect that state affords to presumptions, not
to Rule 301. MOORE, supra note 188, § 302.03. Thus, federal courts may still apply presumptions that shift the
burden of persuasion where the law of a particular state gives presumptions that effect. Consistent with the Erie
doctrine, state law does not govern so called "tactical presumptions," however, because these presumptions do
not operate on an element of a substantive claim or defense, but are rather procedural. MOORE, supra note 188,
§ 302.03. Thus, all tactical presumptions are governed by Rule 301. MOORE, supra note 188, § 302.03. An example of a "tactical presumption" is that upon proof of certain facts of putting a stamped envelope in the mail, a
presumption may arise that the addressee received the letter. MOORE, supra note 188, § 302.04.
205. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
206. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2753 (1993).
207. Id. at 2748-49.
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of presumptions, as well as the text of Rule 301.28 The majority was also correct
in relying on Rule 301 in rejecting the "resurrection" theory advanced by the Fifth
Circuit in Thornbrough.20 9 A presumption under Rule 301 is rebutted by the mere
production of evidence that would dispute the presumed fact, regardless of its veracity."O
The St. Mary's Court believed that Rule 301 would not support a holding that a
finding of pretext mandates a finding for the plaintiff. The majority stated that
holding otherwise would be contrary to Rule 30 I's admonition that presumptions
only shift the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion.211 However, as
the dissent pointed out, the Eighth Circuit Court below in St. Mary's did not hold
that the burden of persuasion had shifted to the defendant to prove that its reason
was the true reason for the employment action.212 Rather, the court held that the
burden of persuasion was on the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered
reason was incorrect.213 This was in keeping with Burdine which expressly stated
that the plaintiff could meet his burden of persuasion by persuading the fact-finder
that the defendant's proffered reasons were untrue.21 4
The majority opinion refused to acknowledge the distinction "between requiring a defendant to prove its legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, which is precluded by [Rule 301], and permitting a plaintiff to disprove it."21 The plaintiff
could still bear the risk of non-persuasion because if the plaintiff fails to persuade
2 ,6
the fact-finder that the defendant has lied, then the plaintiff would lose. Common law principles of evidence support allowing a plaintiff to prevail based on his
discrediting the defendant. The practice of drawing unfavorable inferences against

208. Rule 301 explicitly states: "[A] presumption imposes upon the party against whom it is directed the burFED. R. EvID.
den of going forward with evidence. . . but does not shift to such party the burden of proof ....
301.
209. Recall that in Thornbroughthe court held that upon a finding that the proffered reason was pretextual, the
presumption was "resurrected." See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
210. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 300-03 (Supp. 1990).
211. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
212. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting).
213. Id. The Eighth Circuit opinion stated: "Once plaintiff proved all of defendants' proffered reasons for the
adverse employment actions to be pretextual, plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." St. Mary's,
970 F.2d at 492.
214. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
215. Lanctot, supra note 78, at 119 (footnote omitted).
216. Lanctot, supra note 78, at 119. The majority opinion briefly addressed this argument in a footnote. Justice
Scalia stated:
The dissent's reading leaves some burden of persuasion on the plaintiff, to be sure: the burden of persuading the factfinder that the employer's explanation is not true. But it would be beneath contempt for this
Court, in a unanimous opinion no less, to play such word-games with the concept of "leaving the burden
of persuasion upon the plaintiff."
St. Mary ', 113 S. Ct. at 2753 n.7. It is interesting to note that Justice Scalia did not state in this footnote that this
would be contrary to Rule 301. Regardless of whether the Burdine Court intended to engage in these "wordgames," Justice Scalia's statement implicitly acknowledges that the Court in Burdine could have limited the plaintiffs burden to disproving the defendant's proffered reason without violating the prohibition of Rule 301. Of
course, this contradicts the statement in the text immediately previous to this footnote, that Rule 301 precludes
the dissent's interpretation of Burdine that the plaintiff should prevail merely by showing that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual. Id. at 2753.
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a party who is found to have lied in court has "never been construed to shift the
burden of proof to that party."217 For example, where a witness is shown to have
testified falsely, a fact-finder may permissibly infer that witness should be distrusted on other matters.2 18
There is nothing in Rule 30 I's text or in its history which mandates the majority
opinion's result. Actually, the Advisory Committee's Notes to Rule 301 show that
the Rule should still have some effect on the trial even after the mandatory presumption was rebutted. The Senate Report accompanying the Rule states that the
jury "may infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts giving rise to the presumption" even after the presumption has been rebutted. 19 Also,
assuming that the effect of the enacted Rule was an adoption of Thayer's approach
to presumptions,2 2 the Thayer approach to presumptions does not proscribe any
set method of how courts should proceed after the presumption has been rebutted.
The majority's reliance on Rule 301 after the presumption has been rebutted
amounts to allowing Rule 301 to rule from the grave. When the presumption is rebutted and "drops from the case," Rule 301 should "drop from the case" as well.
Rule 301 is silent as to what issues the fact-finder should address after the presumption has been rebutted. The Court in St. Mary's, if it had so chosen, could
have held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment where he had disproved the
defendant's asserted reason for the employment action without violating Rule
301.221 Thus, Rule 301 did not necessarily support the result in St. Mary's at all.
The Court's reliance on Rule 301 is particularly striking because it has completely ignored the Rule in other areas of law. For example, in Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson,222 the Court held that in private enforcement actions brought under

217. Lanctot, supra note 78, at 120 (footnote omitted).
218. See 2 EDWARD J. DEVITT & CHARLES B. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 73.04

(3d ed. 1977) ("Ifa witness is shown knowingly to have testified falsely concerning any material matter, you have
a right to distrust such witness's testimony in other particulars; and you may reject all the testimony of that witness or give it such credibility as you may think it deserves."). Also, where evidence has been destroyed while in
the possession ofa party, an inference is created that the evidence would be harmful to that party. See 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 157, § 291 ("The failure or refusal to produce a relevant document, or the destruction of it, is evidence
from which alone its contents may be inferred to be unfavorable to the possessor. . . ."). An analogous inference
is created when a witness in the control of another party is missing at trial; the fact-finder may infer that the witness would have testified unfavorably to that party. See Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 (1893).
219. MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01 (quoting S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprintedin
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7055-56).
220. See MOORE, supra note 188, § 301.01. But see CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EviDENCE UNDER THE RULES 802-03 (11 th ed. 1988) (suggesting that the Report of the Senate Committee contained
in the advisory note to Rule 301, see supra note 202, describes something other than a Thayer presumption).
221. Arguably, the Court may place the burden of persuasion on the defendant in Title VII cases despite Rule
301. The Court has stated that Rule 301 in no way affects federal courts' ability to shift the burden of persuasion
onto the defendant. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). In Transportation

Management, the Court stated that Rule 301 "merely defines the word 'presumption.' It in no way restricts the
authority of a court . . . to change the customary burdens of persuasion in a manner that otherwise would be
permissible." Id. at 403-04 n.7. Of course, this reading of Rule 301 begs the question of why it was adopted at
all. For acritique on the futility of Rule 301, see Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions,Inferences and Burden ofProofin
Federal CivilActions-An Anatomy of UnnecessaryAmbiguity and a Proposalfor Reform, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 892
(1982).
222. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, plaintiffs are entitled to a
presumption that market prices were affected by the defendant's alleged misrepresentations.223 This presumption not only shifts the burden of production, but also
shifts the burden of persuasiononto the defendant to prove that its alleged misrepresentation did not affect market prices.224
Presumptions shift the burden of persuasion in school desegregation cases as
well. Where a plaintiff can point to past state enforced discrimination within a
school district, a presumption arises that present racial imbalances are attributable
to past discriminatory practices.22 This presumption shifts the burden of persuasion onto the school district to prove that the present imbalances are attributable to
factors other than race discrimination.226 As recently as 1992, in Freeman v.
Pitts,2 27 the Court continued to apply this presumption despite the apparent conflict with Rule 301.228 Interestingly, Justice Scalia's opinion in Freeman failed to
even mention Rule 301.229
VII. CONCLUSION

Title VII disparate treatment case law has been plagued with ambiguity since
the Court first established the McDonnell Douglas framework. The St. Mary's
holding, that rejection of the defendant's proferred explanation does not mandate a
judgment for the plaintiff, narrows the ambiguity somewhat. However, as evidenced by the divergent case law which has already emerged, questions remain as
to what burden an employment discrimination plaintiff must carry in order to survive a motion for summary judgment.2 30 The proper reading of St. Mary's is that a
plaintiff may survive a summary judgment motion by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the credibility of the defendant's explanation. Also,
as the Griffiths Court pointed out, a plaintiff who has established a prima facie
case by a preponderance of the evidence should in most cases be entitled to reach
trial and cross-examine the defendant's witnesses before the court should consider
a defendant's summary judgment motion.231 Thus, despite the headlines to the

223. Id. at 248-49.
224. Id.
225. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1970).
226. Id.
227. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
228. Id. at 1447. As this presumption was created several years before Rule 301 was adopted, and it applies
only to school districts operating under a district court order, the argument that the rule should alter the presumption's effect is less strong. However, it is important to note that the presumption created in Basic was created over
10 years after Rule 301 was adopted and applies to defendants who are not under court order as are the defendants
in the school desegregation cases.
229. Id. at 1450-54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
230. See supra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
231. See supr notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
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contrary,2" 2 the holding of St. Mary's will not impose an undue burden on employment discrimination plaintiffs. This conclusion is especially true given that Title
VII cases may now be heard by juries. As one commentator has already pointed
out, "[r]arely can it be envisioned that a jury. . . will hold for a lying defendantemployer."2"3

The effect of the St. Mary's Court's interpretation of Rule 301 is difficult to predict. Rule 301 has been much criticized and largely ignored since its adoption.2"4
Moreover, as the discussion of the Basic and Freeman cases demonstrates, the
Court has completely ignored the Rule in other contexts. While the St. Mary's
Court unequivocally relied on the Rule for its holding, the discussion of the Rule
was somewhat cursory when compared to the lengthy debate over the proper interpretation of Burdine and McDonnell Douglas. Arguably, this leads to the conclusion that the inclusion of Rule 301 was more of an after-the-fact addition to bolster
the majority's argument, rather than a discussion of an issue which the Court necessarily considered, and found dispositive, before making its decision. Thus, it is
doubtful that the majority opinion's "discovery" of Rule 301 in St. Mary's will upset the current operation of presumptions in other areas of law.

232. See, e.g., Timothy M. Phelps, Harderto Prove Job Bias- Supreme Court Sets Tougher Standard, NEwSJune 26, 1993. Of course, St.Mary's will hamper plaintiffs in those circuits which made a finding of pretext
synonymous with a finding of intentional discrimination. However, for plaintiffs in circuits which were granting
defendants' summary judgment motions even where the plaintiffs could create a fact question as to pretext, the
Court's ruling will undoubtedly help them prevail.
233. John J. Ross, The Employment Law Yearin Review (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. H4-5163, 1993) (available on Westlaw).
234. See supra note 221.
DAY,

